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Fragmentation or Stabilization? Recent Case Law on the Crime of Genocide in 
light of the 2007 Judgment of the International Court of Justice 
 
by William Schabas OC MRIA* 
For publication in the Nigerian Yearbook of International Law 
 
The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide was the 
first human rights treaty to be adopted by the General Assembly of the United 
Nations. By a unanimous resolution on 9 December 1948, the Assembly approved the 
text that had been negotiated over the previous two years, opening the Convention for 
signature. On the same day, it also adopted a companion resolution mandating the 
creation of an international criminal court, giving effect to the reference to such an 
institution in article 6 of the Convention itself. But within a few years, international 
criminal law had gone into virtual hibernation from which it was not to emerge for 
more than four decades. 
The year 1998 witnessed the glorious achievement of the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court. As for the Genocide Convention, its fiftieth anniversary 
that same year was barely noticed. Yet in the decade that followed, important 
judgments were issued by the ad hoc tribunals that applied and interpreted the 
provisions of the Convention. There was a virtual explosion of academic writing on 
this hitherto neglected instrument. This was all crowned by a seminal ruling of the 
International Court of Justice in February 2007, in the case of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina v. Serbia.1 
 Since the 2007 judgment, other international courts and tribunals have reacted 
to its holdings. There have been important rulings of the ad hoc tribunals, notably the 
Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, 
but also judgments of the International Criminal Court and the European Court of 
Human Rights dealing with the interpretation and application of provisions of the 
Convention. In February 2015, the International Court of Justice issued a second 
important judgment dealing with application of the Genocide Convention to the                                                         
* Professor of international law, Middlesex University, London; professor of international criminal law 
and human rights, Leiden University; emeritus professor of human rights law, National University of 
Ireland Galway. 
1 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia 
and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007. 
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Balkan wars of the 1990s, in the case of Croatia v. Serbia.2 The international case law 
dealing with genocide that was issued over the eight years between the two judgments 
of the International Criminal Court is the subject matter of this essay. 
 
The European Court of Human Rights 
 
The European Court of Human Rights was the first international judicial body to 
consider the 2007 judgment of the International Court of Justice. The case, Jorgić v. 
Germany, involved the application of article 7 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights. Article 7 enshrines the principle of legality and is very similar to provisions in 
other international instruments, such as article 11(2) of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights and article 15 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights. Jorgić had been prosecuted in Germany pursuant to German law for crimes 
perpetrated in Bosnia and Herzegovina during the 1992-1995 war, including 
genocide. He was convicted of acts of ‘ethnic cleansing’ pursuant to what the 
European Court described as a ‘wide interpretation of the “intent to destroy”’ as set 
out in article 2 of the Genocide Convention. 3  Before the European Court Jorgić 
argued that the German courts did not respect the principle of legality. 
In reviewing the relevant legal sources, something that is a typical feature of 
its judgments, the Court cited an excerpt from paragraph 190 of the judgment of the 
International Court of Justice, where the notion of ‘ethnic cleansing’ is discussed. 
According to the International Court of Justice: ‘This is not to say that acts described 
as “ethnic cleansing” may never constitute genocide, if they are such as to be 
characterized as, for example, “deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life 
calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part”, contrary to 
Article II, paragraph (c), of the Convention, provided such action is carried out with 
the necessary specific intent (dolus specialis), that is to say with a view to the 
destruction of the group…’4  
The European Court of Human Rights noted that the case law of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia supported a narrow 
interpretation whereby genocide ‘as defined in public international law, comprised                                                         
2 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia 
v. Serbia), Judgment, 3 February 2015. 
3 Jorgic v. Germany, no. 74613/01, § 112, ECHR 2007-III. 
4 Ibid., § 45. 
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only acts aimed at the physical or biological destruction of a protected group’.5 But it 
said that because the Tribunal’s interpretation of the scope of genocide, as well as 
other decisions taken by national and international courts, ‘in particular the 
International Court of Justice’, had been delivered subsequent to the commission of 
his offences, ‘the applicant could not rely on this interpretation being taken by the 
German courts in respect of German law at the material time, that is, when he 
committed his offences’.6 Thus, in the Jorgić case the European Court held that a 
conviction by German courts based upon a broader construction of the scope of 
genocide than that espoused by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia as well as by the International Court of Justice in the February 2007 
judgment did not violate the principle of legality. 
There is also a lengthy reference to the 2007 judgment of the International 
Court of Justice in an admissibility decision of the European Court of Human Rights 
issued in July 2013. The application was submitted by an association of survivors of 
the Srebrenica massacre. It was directed against the Netherlands and concerned 
conduct attributed to the Dutch units of United Nations peacekeeping troops. A seven-
judge Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights reviewed a range of legal 
materials concerning Srebrenica including relevant judgments of various courts and 
tribunals, such as the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and 
the Human Rights Chamber of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The admissibility decision 
contains a five-paragraph overview of the February 2007 judgment of the 
International Court of Justice.7 The Court declared the case inadmissible based upon 
the immunities of the United Nations. Aside from a summary of the judgment of the 
International Court of Justice in the Bosnia case, presented as background, the 
European Court was strongly influenced by rulings of the International Court of 
Justice respecting immunities, notably the recent decision in the Jurisdictional 
Immunities of the State case.8 
There are also some summary references to the 2007 judgment by a Chamber 
of the European Court in a case directed against Switzerland concerning genocide 
                                                        
5 Ibid., § 112. 
6 Ibid., § 112. 
7 Stichting Mothers of Srebrenica and Others v. the Netherlands (dec.), no. 65542/12, §§ 49-53, 11 
June 2013. 
8 Cited at Stichting Mothers of Srebrenica and Others v. the Netherlands (dec.), no. 65542/12, § 158, 
11 June 2013. 
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denial legislation.9 The 2007 judgment of the International Court of Justice was also 
cited by the European Court of Human Rights with respect to its statements on State 
responsibility, attribution and the ‘direct control’ criterion.10 In addition, the 1996 
interlocutory ruling in the same case was also cited by a judge of the European Court 
of Human Rights in a separate opinion as authority for the proposition that human 
rights obligations are not by nature reciprocal.11 
Two Grand Chamber decisions of the European Court of Human Rights 
dealing with genocide were delivered in October 2015, after the February 2015 
decision of the International Court of Justice, and are therefore outside the scope of 
this study.12 
 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
 
The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda has issued many decisions 
concerning genocide, at both the trial and the appeals stage, but as a general rule these 
have contributed only modestly to the interpretation of articles 2 and 3 of the 
Genocide Convention. In several of the Appeals Chamber judgments decided since 
February 2007, the defence raised very broad and often unsubstantiated allegations 
that the Trial Chamber had misapplied the law on genocide. 13  In others, issues 
relating to the definition of genocide have not arisen at all.14 Similarly, there is little 
of interest in terms of legal development in the Trial Chamber judgments issued in 
recent years.15 These decisions do not generally address any new issues concerning                                                         
9 Perinçek v. Switzerland, no. 27510/08, §§ 23, 83, 116, 17 December 2013. 
10  Catan and Others v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia [GC], nos. 43370/04, 8252/05 and 
18454/06, §§ 76, 96, 115, 19 October 2012. 
11 Vallianatos and Others v. Greece [GC], nos. 29381/09 and 32684/09, Partly Concurring, Partly 
Dissenting Opinion of Judge Pinto de Albuquerque, 7 November 2013. 
12 Perinçek v. Switzerland [GC], no. 27510/08, 15 October 2015; Vasiliauskas v. Lithuania, [GC], no. 
35343/05, 20 November 2015. 
13 Simba v. Prosecutor (ICTR-01-76-A), Judgment, 27 November 2007, paras. 256-270; Bagosora and 
Nsengiyumva v. Prosecutor (ICTR-98-41-A), Judgment, 14 December 2011, paras. 382-386. 
14 Karera v. Prosecutor (ICTR-01-74-A), Judgment, 2 February 2009; Bikindi v. Prosecutor (ICTR-01-
72-A), Judgment, 18 March 2010; Prosecutor v. Rukundo (ICTR-2001-70-A), Judgment, 20 October 
2010; Zigiranyirazo v. Prosecutor (ICTR-01-73-A), Judgment, 18 December 2010; Muvunyi v. 
Prosecutor (ICTR-2000-55A-A), Judgment, 1 April 2011; Mugenzi and Mugiraneza v. Prosecutor 
(ICTR-99-50-A), Judgment, 4 February 2013. 
15 Prosecutor v. François Karera (ICTR-01-74-T), Judgment and Sentence, 7 December 2007, paras. 
533-549; Prosecutor v. Nchamihigo (ICTR-01-63-T), Judgment and Sentence, 12 November 2008, 
paras. 329-336; Prosecutor v. Bikindi (ICTR-01-72-T), Judgment, 2 December 2008, paras. 404-426; 
Prosecutor v. Théoneste Bagosora et al. (ICTR-98-41-T), Judgment and Sentence, 18 December 2008, 
paras. 2084-2163; Prosecutor v. Zigiranyirazo (ICTR-01-73-T), Judgment, 18 December 2008, paras. 
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interpretation of the definition of genocide. Typically, they consist of relatively 
perfunctory recitals of the case law. For that reason, they do not deserve any particular 
attention here. 
It may seem astonishing that this Tribunal, whose work has been devoted very 
largely to the implementation of the 1948 Genocide Convention, does not appear to 
have ever made reference to the 2007 judgment of the International Court of Justice. 
Indeed, it has virtually never referred to the case law of the Court at all.16 There is one 
obscure mention of the 1996 Preliminary Objections ruling in the Bosnia case, on the 
erga omnes nature of the obligations in the 1948 Convention, but that is only because 
one of the parties cited it, prompting the Court to acknowledge the reference in its 
summary of the positions taken by the parties.17 
The fact that there is little of interest in the post-February 2007 decisions of 
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda may only reflect the fact that its case 
law, at least as the definition of the crime of genocide is concerned, had already 
become quite developed and detailed, leaving little room for dispute or challenge. 
Many of the issues and controversies that were so important to the context of the 
former Yugoslavia, such as the demarcation between genocide and ethnic cleansing 
and the significance of forcible displacement, never seriously arose in the Rwandan 
                                                                                                                                                              
396-428; Prosecutor v. Renzaho (ICTR-97-31-T), Judgment and Sentence, 14 July 2009, paras. 760-
780; Prosecutor v. Nsengimana (ICTR-01-69-T), Judgment, 17 November 2009, paras. 831-841; 
Prosecutor v. Rukundo (ICTR-2001-70-T), Judgment, 27 February 2009, paras. 555-576; Prosecutor v. 
Ndindiliyimana et al. (ICTR-00-56-T), Judgment and Sentence, 17 May 2011, paras. 2044-2085; 
Prosecutor v. Nyiramasuhuko et al. (ICTR-98-42-T), Judgment and Sentence, 24 June 2011, paras. 
5653-6038; Prosecutor v. Bizimungu et al. (ICTR-99-50-T), Judgment and Sentence, 30 September 
2011, paras. 1954-1987; Prosecutor v. Karemera et al. (ICTR-98-44-T), Judgment and Sentence, 2 
February 2012, paras. 1575-1672. 
16 Prosecutor v. Bagaragaza (ICTR-2005-86-11bis), Decision on Prosecutor’s Request for Referral of 
the Indictment to the Kingdom of the Netherlands, 13 April 2007, para. 23, fn. 32, citing Applicability 
of Article VI, Section 22, of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, 
Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1989, p. 177, para. 47; Prosecutor v. Rwamakuba (ICTR-98-44C-I), 
Decision on Appropriate Remedy, 31 January 2007, para. 48, fn. 71, citing Interpretation of the 
Agreement of 25 March 1951 between the WHO and Egypt, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1980, p. 
73 and Reparation for injuries suffered in the service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. 
Reports 1949, p. 174; Prosecutor v. Karemera et al. (ICTR-98-44-T), Decision on Nzirorera’s 
Preliminary Motion to Dismiss the Indictment for Lack of Jurisdiction: Chapter VII of the United 
Nations Charter, 29 March 2004, para. 10, fn. 4, citing Legal Consequences for States of the Continued 
Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 
276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1971, p. 16; Prosecutor v. Karemera et al. (ICTR-98-44-
PT), Decision on Severance of André Rwamakuba and Amendments of the Indictment, 7 December 
2004, para. 22, fn. 22, citing Case concerning the Northern Cameroons (Cameroon v. United 
Kingdom), Preliminary Objections, Judgment of 2 December 1963, I.C.J. Reports 1963, p. 15 and 
Nuclear Tests (Australia v. France), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1974, p. 253. 
17 Prosecutor v. Bagaragaza (ICTR-2005-86-11bis), Decision on Prosecutor’s Request for Referral of 
the Indictment to the Kingdom of the Netherlands, 13 April 2007, para. 23, fn. 33. 
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context. The major contribution by the Rwanda Tribunal to the development of the 
law of the Genocide Convention addressed the crime of direct and public 
incitement,18 a matter that is not of any great relevance to the present proceedings. 
One judgment of the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal 
for Rwanda, issued in March 2008, is of importance for its discussion of the actus 
reus of the second act of genocide, that is, causing serious bodily and mental harm to 
members of the group. The Chamber said that in its previous judgments it had not 
‘squarely addressed the definition of such harm’. 19  It said that ‘quintessential 
examples of serious bodily harm are torture, rape, and non-fatal physical violence that 
causes disfigurement or serious injury to the external or internal organs’. 20  The 
Appeals Chamber said that serious mental harm includes ‘more than minor or 
temporary impairment of mental faculties such as the infliction of strong fear or 
terror, intimidation or threat’.21 Noting that nearly all convictions for genocide on the 
basis of causing serious bodily or mental harm had involved killing or rape, the 
Chamber said that ‘[t]o support a conviction for genocide, the bodily harm or the 
mental harm inflicted on members of a group must be of such a serious nature as to 
threaten its destruction in whole or in part’. 22  In a footnote to this remark, the 
Chamber noted that in a decision concerning a charge of crimes against humanity a 
Trial Chamber has said it was ‘not satisfied that [the removal of a church roof 
depriving Tutsis of an effective hiding place] amount[ed] to an act of similar 
seriousness to other enumerated acts in the Article”.23 The Appeals Chamber also 
cited the commentary on the Code of Crimes in the 1996 report of the International 
Law Commission.24 
The Appeals Chamber of the Rwanda Tribunal referred to statements in the 
trial judgment that the accused, who was a Catholic priest, had refused to allow Tutsi 
refugees to get food from a banana plantation, something that contributed to their 
physical weakening, and that ‘his order prohibiting refugees from getting food from                                                         
18 Nahimana et al. v. Prosecutor (ICTR-99-52-A), Judgment, 28 November 2007. 




23  Ibid., fn. 117, citing Prosecutor v. Ntakirutimana et al. (ICTR-96-10-A and ICTR-96-17-A), 
Judgment, 13 December 2004, para. 855. 
24 The reference in Seromba is to the Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its 
Forty-Eighth Session 6 May-26 July 1996, UN GAOR International Law Commission, 51st Sess., 
Supp. No. 10, p. 91, UN Doc. A/51/10 (1996). However the precise reference appears to be erroneous; 
the statement to which the Appeals Chamber seems to have been referring appears on p. 46. 
Genocide and the International Court of Justice - Schabas 7 
the banana plantation, his refusal to celebrate mass in Nyange church, and his 
decision to expel employees and Tutsi refugees’ had facilitated the victims ‘living in a 
constant state of anxiety’. 25  The Appeals Chamber mentioned the ‘parsimonious 
statements’ of the Trial Chamber about the acts allegedly comprising the serious 
bodily and mental harm, concluding that it could not ‘equate nebulous invocations of 
“weakening” and “anxiety” with the heinous crimes that obviously constitute serious 
bodily or mental harm, such as rape and torture’.26 These words were endorsed in a 
July 2013 ruling of the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the former Yugoslavia.27 
In another decision, the issue of proof of genocidal intent prompted the 
Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda to recall that in 
the absence of direct evidence, ‘a perpetrator's intent to commit genocide may be 
inferred from relevant facts and circumstances, including the general context of the 
perpetration of other culpable acts systematically directed against the same group, the 
scale of atrocities committed, the systematic targeting of victims on account of their 
membership in a particular group, or the repetition of destructive and discriminatory 
acts’.28 The Chamber noted that even facts and events that arose subsequent to the 
perpetration of the crime itself could be considered as part of the context for this 
purpose.29 
In Prosecutor v. Gatete, issued in October 2012, the Appeals Chamber 
confirmed that the rule against cumulative convictions is not breached when 
convictions for both genocide per se and conspiracy to commit genocide are entered. 
The Chamber reasoned that conspiracy does not involve commission of the crime as 
such. It held that the two crimes, genocide and conspiracy, were distinct, and that ‘the 
crime of genocide has a materially distinct actus reus from the crime of conspiracy to 
commit genocide and both crimes are based on different underlying conduct’. 
According to the Appeals Chamber, ‘[t]he crime of genocide requires the commission 
of one of the enumerated acts in Article 2(2) of the Statute, while the crime of 
conspiracy to commit genocide requires the act of entering into an agreement to 
                                                        
25 Prosecutor v. Seromba (ICTR-2001-66-A), Judgment, 12 March 2008, para. 47. 
26 Ibid., para. 48. 
27 Prosecutor v. Karadžić (IT-95-5/18-AR98bis.l), Judgment, 11 July 2013, para. 32, fn. 83. 
28 Hategekimana v. Prosecutor (ICTR-00-55B-A), Judgment, 8 May 2012, para. 133. 
29 Ibid. 
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commit genocide’.30 It overturned the Trial Chamber’s holding to convict the accused 
of genocide but not to enter a conviction for conspiracy because ‘by convicting Gatete 
only of genocide while he was also found criminally responsible for conspiracy to 
commit genocide, the Trial Chamber failed to hold him responsible for the totality of 
his criminal conduct, which included entering into the unlawful agreement to commit 
genocide’.31 
The Appeals Chamber also explained that by recognising conspiracy to 
commit genocide as an inchoate crime, the Genocide Convention ‘aims to prevent the 
commission of genocide’. However, it said ‘another reason for criminalising 
conspiracy to commit genocide is to punish the collaboration of a group of individuals 
resolved to commit genocide. The danger represented by such collaboration itself 
justifies the incrimination of acts of conspiracy, irrespective of whether the 
substantive crime of genocide has been committed.’32 
One member of the Appeals Chamber, Judge Agius, dissented on this point. 
Judge Agius had been the presiding judge in the Popović trial before the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, which is discussed below. In his 
dissenting opinion in Gatete, Judge Agius said that he did not disagree with the 
majority’s statement of the legal principles concerning the distinct nature of the crime 
of conspiracy to commit genocide. However, he considered that entering a conviction 
for conspiracy in addition to one for genocide raised problems of fairness to the 
accused. 33  He said he disagreed with the majority’s holding that the danger 
represented by the impugned collaboration itself justified the incrimination of acts of 
conspiracy, irrespective of whether the substantive crime of genocide has been 
committed. 34 He repeated the reasoning he had advanced in Popović that once a 
person is convicted for genocide the rationale for adding a conviction for conspiracy 
becomes ‘less compelling’, especially when the criminal responsibility is based upon 
participation in a joint criminal enterprise.35 
 
                                                        
30 Prosecutor v. Gatete (ICTR-00-61-A), Judgment, 9 October 2012, para. 260. 
31 Ibid., para. 261. 
32 Ibid., para. 262 (reference omitted). 
33 Prosecutor v. Gatete (ICTR-00-61-A), Dissenting Opinion of Judge Agius, 9 October 2012, para. 3. 
34 Ibid., para. 4. 
35 Ibid., para. 5. For the discussion to which Judge Agius refers, see: Prosecutor v. Popović et al. (IT 
IT-05-88-T), Judgment, 10 June 2010, paras. 2111-2127. 
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International Criminal Court 
 
At the International Criminal Court, there is a pending charge of genocide in the 
proceedings directed against the President of Sudan, Omar Al Bashir. Because the 
Court has been unable to obtain custody over the accused, there have been no 
developments with respect to interpretation of the crime of genocide since the 
issuance of the arrest warrant in 2010. Nevertheless, the decisions concerning 
issuance of the arrest warrant contain a very rich discussion of aspects of the law of 
genocide including significant references to the 2007 ruling of the International Court 
of Justice in the Bosnia case. 
Pre-Trial Chamber I, to which the case was initially assigned, concurred with 
the Prosecutor’s application with respect to war crimes and crimes against humanity 
but it declined to authorise a charge of genocide when it issued the arrest warrant in 
this case.36 The decision was later overturned, the Appeals Chamber considering that 
the standard the Pre-Trial Chamber had set for determining the charges it would 
authorise was too demanding at this stage of proceedings.37 The Pre-Trial Chamber 
subsequently added the genocide charge to the Al Bashir arrest warrant.38 Much of the 
initial ruling on issuance of the arrest warrant consisted of a discussion of the 
definition of genocide. There was also a substantial dissenting opinion about the 
majority’s exclusion of the crime of genocide from the warrant. The two subsequent 
decisions, of the Appeals Chamber and the Pre-Trial Chamber, do not really 
contribute anything of interest with respect to interpretation of the definition of 
genocide. 
The Pre-Trial Chamber invoked the 2007 judgment of the International Court 
of Justice on more than twenty occasions. At no point did it suggest that it disagreed 
with any aspect of the decision of the Court.39                                                         
36 Prosecutor v. Bashir (ICC-02/05-01/09), Decision on the Prosecution's Application for a Warrant of 
Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, 4 March 2009. 
37 Prosecutor v. Bashir (ICC-02/05-01/09), Judgment on the appeal of the Prosecutor against the 
"Decision on the Prosecution's Application for a Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al 
Bashir", 3 February 2010. 
38 Prosecutor v. Bashir (ICC-02/05-01/09), Second Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for a 
Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, 12 July 2010. 
39 Prosecutor v. Bashir (ICC-02/05-01/09), Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for a Warrant of 
Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, 4 March 2009, para. 114, fn. 133, para. 135, fns. 148, 
149 and 150, para. 137, fn. 152, para. 138, fn. 153, para. 139, fn. 154, para. 140, fn. 155, para. 142, fn. 
156, para. 143, fn. 157, para. 144, fns. 158, 159 and 160, para. 146, fns. 161, 162 and 163, para. 167, 
fn. 188, para. 182, fns. 202, 203, 204, 205 and 206, para. 183, fns. 207 and 208, para. 194, fn. 221. 
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An important feature of the International Criminal Court’s interpretation of the 
scope of the crime is its consideration of an additional source of law, the Elements of 
Crimes. This is a secondary instrument adopted by the Assembly of States Parties 
whose purpose, according to article 9(1) of the Rome Statute, is to ‘assist the Court in 
the interpretation and application’ of definitions of crimes contained in articles 6, 7, 8 
and 8bis. They are required to be ‘consistent’ with the Rome Statute,40 and are listed 
in article 2 as the sources of law to be applied ‘in the first place’,41 along with the 
Statute and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. 
The Elements largely echo the text of article 6 of the Statute, which is 
essentially identical to article 2 of the 1948 Genocide Convention. However, they also 
contain some language that is not part of that text. In the Bashir arrest warrant 
decision, the majority said that in this way the Elements of Crimes ‘elaborate on the 
definition of genocide provided for in article 6 of the Statute’.42 First, they require that 
the victims belong to the targeted group. Second, they require that the punishable acts 
- killings, serious bodily or mental harm, imposition of conditions of life - take place 
‘in the context of a manifest pattern of similar conduct directed against that group or 
was conduct that could itself effect such destruction’. Third, they specify that the 
perpetrator act with the intent to destroy in whole or in part the targeted group. The 
first and third of these elements do not raise any particular difficulties. They find 
much support in the case law of the ad hoc tribunals, the travaux préparatoires and 
the scholarly literature. The second element is more controversial. 
It appears that the second of these elements, namely the requirement that 
genocidal acts took place ‘in the context of a manifest pattern of similar conduct 
directed against that group or was conduct that could itself effect such destruction’, 
was not included in the original drafts of the Elements of Crimes debated by the 
Preparatory Commission of the International Criminal Court during its 1999 
sessions.43 This Element was added to the draft at the beginning of 2000,44 apparently 
in reaction to the first judgment of the Yugoslavia Tribunal that dealt with the merits                                                         
40 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, (2002) 187 UNTS 90, art. 9(3). 
41 Ibid., art. 21(1)(a). 
42 Prosecutor v. Bashir (ICC-02/05-01/09), Decision on the Prosecution's Application for a Warrant of 
Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, 4 March 2009, para. 113. 
43 See, e.g., PCNICC/1999/L.5/Rev.1/Add.2, pp. 5-7, issued 22 December 1999. The initial proposal 
for the Elements of Crimes, submitted by the United States, borrowed the ‘widespread or systematic’ 
language from the Rome Statute’s definition of crimes against humanity: Proposal Submitted by the 
United States of America, Draft elements of crimes, PCNICC/1999/DP.4. 
44 PCNICC/2000/L.1/Rev.1/Add.2, pp. 6-8 (issued 7 April 2000). 
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of a genocide charge. 45 In that ruling, a Trial Chamber of the Tribunal held that 
genocide could be committed by an individual acting alone, even in the absence of 
evidence that this was part of some larger policy, plan, or campaign involving others, 
and without any requirement that the intentions of the individual perpetrator had any 
reasonable chance of being achieved. Those who drafted the Elements of Crimes 
appear to have added the requirements of a manifest pattern of similar conduct or 
conduct that could itself effect such destruction in order to prevent the International 
Criminal Court from adopting a similar interpretation of the scope of the crime of 
genocide. 
The contextual element set out in the Elements of Crimes was invoked by Pre-
Trial Chamber I in its decision on the Bashir arrest warrant. The Chamber recognised 
that the definition in the Genocide Convention itself ‘does not expressly require any 
contextual element’.46 It then considered the case law of the ad hoc tribunals, which 
have not insisted upon a plan or policy as an element of the crime of genocide.47 It 
must be said that all of the judgments of the ad hoc tribunals are rather hypothetical 
when it comes to this question. To use the common law expression, they represent 
obiter dicta. At the Rwanda Tribunal, there has never really been any doubt that the 
killings of several hundred thousand Tutsi in 1994 were the product of a plan or 
policy. The judgments of the Yugoslavia Tribunal are even more abstract given the 
fact that the only convictions for genocide concern the Srebrenica massacre, where 
the existence of a plan or policy is not seriously questioned and it is not suggested that 
this was the act of a single individual. 
In the Jelisić case, a Trial Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the former Yugoslavia dismissed a charge of aiding and abetting genocide because of 
insufficient evidence the crime was being perpetrated by persons other than the 
accused. It then went on to rule that a conviction for genocide was in any event 
‘theoretically possible’ because an individual, acting alone, could perpetrate the 
crime. 48  The Trial Chamber concluded that Jelisić was such a mentally unstable 
                                                        
45 Prosecutor v. Jelisić (IT-95-10-T), Judgment, 14 December 1999. 
46 Prosecutor v. Bashir (ICC-02/05-01/09), Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for a Warrant of 
Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, 4 March 2009, para. 117. 
47 Ibid., para. 119, citing: Prosecutor v. Jelisić (IT-95-10-T), Judgment, 14 December 1999, para. 400 
(an error; the correct reference is to para. 100); Prosecutor v. Akayesu (ICTR-96-4-T), Judgment, 2 
September 1998, paras. 520, 523. 
48 Prosecutor v. Jelisić (IT-95-10-T), Judgment, 14 December 1999, para. 100; affirmed: Prosecutor v. 
Jelisić (IT-95-10-A), Judgment, 5 July 2001. 
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individual that he was not capable of forming a genocidal intent and he was acquitted 
of the charge. But the conclusion in Jelisić that genocide could be commited by an 
individual perpetrator, acting alone, and in the absence of a broader plan or policy, 
remains the law of the Yugoslavia Tribunal. 
In Bashir, Pre-Trial Chamber I compared the Elements of Crimes and the case 
law of the ad hoc tribunals, observing that: 
 
the crime of genocide is completed by, inter alia, killing or causing serious bodily harm to a single 
individual with the intent to destroy in whole or in part the group to which such individual belongs. As a 
result, according to this case law, for the purpose of completing the crime of genocide, it is irrelevant 
whether the conduct in question is capable of posing any concrete threat to the existence of the targeted 
group, or a part thereof.49 
 
Pre-Trial Chamber I said that following this interpretative approach, the crime of 
genocide depends upon proof that the accused had the intent to destroy the protected 
group, and that ‘[a]s soon as this intent exists and materializes in an isolated act of a 
single individual, the protection is triggered, regardless of whether the latent threat to 
the existence of the targeted group posed by the said intent has turned into a concrete 
threat to the existence in whole or in part of that group’.50 
Noting ‘a certain controversy’ as to whether the contextual element in the 
Elements of Crimes should be applied,51 Pre-Trial Chamber I quite clearly distanced 
itself from the case law of the ad hoc tribunals. It highlighted the importance of the 
contextual element set out expressly in the Elements of Crimes. 
 
In the view of the Majority, according to this contextual element, the crime of genocide is only 
completed when the relevant conduct presents a concrete threat to the existence of the targeted group, or 
a part thereof. In other words, the protection offered by the penal norm defining the crime of genocide – 
as an ultima ratio mechanism to preserve the highest values of the international community – is only 
triggered when the threat against the existence of the targeted group, or part thereof, becomes concrete 
and real, as opposed to just being latent or hypothetical.52 
 
Dissenting, Judge Ušacka insisted that the role of the Elements of Crimes was only to 
‘assist’ the Court, and hinted at the view that in the Bashir case they were inconsistent 
                                                        
49 Prosecutor v. Bashir (ICC-02/05-01/09), Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for a Warrant of 
Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, 4 March 2009, para. 119 (references omitted). Contra: 
Bashir (ICC-02/05-01/09), Separate and Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Anita Ušacka, 4 March 
2009, para. 19, fn. 26. 
50 Ibid., para. 120.  
51 Ibid., para. 125. 
52 Ibid., para. 124. 
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with article 6 of the Statute, a point she said did not need to be determined in the case 
at bar.53 
The Pre-Trial Chamber might well have justified the difference in its approach 
and that of the ad hoc tribunals by relying exclusively on the requirements imposed 
by the Elements of Crimes, thereby avoiding any implication of disapproval of the 
interpretation of the Yugoslavia Tribunal in Jelisić. However, it went on to state that it 
did not see any ‘irreconcilable contradiction’ between the definition of genocide in 
article 6 of the Rome Statute and the criterion of a contextual element set out in the 
Elements.54 
 
Quite the contrary, the Majority considers that the definition of the crime of genocide, so as to require 
for its completion an actual threat to the targeted group, or a part thereof, is (i) not per se contrary to 
article 6 of the Statute; (ii) fully respects the requirements of article 22(2) of the Statute that the 
definition of the crimes ‘shall be strictly construed and shall not be extended by analogy’ and ‘[i]n case 
of ambiguity, the definition shall be interpreted in favour of the person being investigated, prosecuted or 
convicted’; and (iii) is fully consistent with the traditional consideration of the crime of genocide as the 
‘crime of the crimes’.55 
 
The decision represents therefore an important development in the 
jurisprudence of the International Criminal Court. It departs from established case law 
of the ad hoc tribunals on a significant substantive legal issue. The debate is about 
whether the contextual element contained in the Elements of Crimes represents a 
clarification of the scope of the definition of genocide taken from article 2 of the 
Convention or whether it is a limitation or restriction imposed by States in the 
particular context of the adoption of a supplementary instrument to the Rome Statute. 
Those who see it as a narrowing of the Convention definition argue that the Elements 
of Crimes are ‘jurisdictional’ in nature. Their contention, which is often driven by a 
visceral resistance to anything that appears to narrow or limit definitions of crimes at 
the international level, is essentially based upon a literal reading of the text of the 
Convention. They assert that because the contextual element is not set out explicitly in 
the definition of the crime taken from article 2 of the Genocide Convention, that it 
therefore represents a change or alteration. 
The                                                          
53 Prosecutor v. Bashir (ICC-02/05-01/09), Separate and Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Anita 
Ušacka, 4 March 2009, para. 20. 
54 Prosecutor v. Bashir (ICC-02/05-01/09), Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for a Warrant of 
Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, 4 March 2009, para. 132. 
55 Ibid., para. 133. 
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The position that the Elements of Crimes merely clarify the content of article 2 
of the Convention finds support in general rules of treaty law. The Elements may be 
considered as ‘subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation 
of the treaty or the application of its provisions’ or ‘subsequent practice in the 
application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its 
interpretation’, well-known concepts set out in article 31(3) of the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties. There cannot be much doubt that the drafters of the Rome 
Statute, at the 1998 diplomatic conference and before, treated article 2 of the 1948 
Convention as somewhat of a sacred text that was not to be modified at all. It is 
striking that article 6 of the Rome Statute faithfully respects the text of article 2 of the 
1948 Convention, whereas the definitions of the other categories of crime that were 
adopted at the Rome Conference vary significantly from earlier models. In effect, they 
dramatically develop the codifications of both crimes against humanity and war 
crimes. However, when the Rome Conference turned to the crime of genocide, there 
was resistance to any change whatsoever in the 1948 text. There was only one hint 
that it might be changed, a casual proposal by Cuba for inclusion of political and 
social groups that was never even submitted as a formal amendment.56 Many States 
took the floor to insist upon fidelity to the 1948 version.57 
It seems implausible therefore that in June and July 1998, at the Rome 
Conference, States more or less unanimously expressed their allegiance to the 1948 
definition of genocide but that two years later, when the Preparatory Commission was 
drafting the Elements of Crimes, they intended to depart from that definition with a 
so-called ‘jurisdictional’ limitation on the scope of genocide. Pursuant to the Final 
Act of the Rome Conference, the Preparatory Commission had the same composition 
as the Rome Conference, so it cannot be argued that it was not as representative or 
that its membership differed. Nevertheless, the fact that the intent of the Preparatory 
Commission was to elucidate the scope of the 1948 definition does not necessarily 
lead to the conclusion that it did not, as a matter of law, effect what amounts to an 
amendment rather than an interpretative clarification. 
In the Bashir arrest warrant decision, the Pre-Trial Chamber recognised the 
development by scholars of what has been identified as a ‘knowledge-based’ 
                                                        
56 UN Doc. A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.3, para. 100. 
57 See particularly the debates at UN Doc. A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.3, paras. 20-179. 
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approach to genocide.58 The Pre-Trial Chamber described the approach as facilitating 
the criminal responsibility of ‘direct perpetrators and mid-level commanders … even 
if they act without the dolus specialis/specific intent to destroy in whole or in part the 
targeted group’. It said that according to the knowledge-based approach, ‘as long as 
those senior political and/or military leaders who planned and set into motion a 
genocidal campaign act with the requisite dolus specialis/ulterior intent, those others 
below them, who pass on instructions and/or physically implement such a genocidal 
campaign, will commit genocide as long as they are aware that the ultimate purpose 
of such a campaign is to destroy in whole or in part the targeted group’. The Pre-Trial 
Chamber insisted that the so-called ‘knowledge-based approach’ is not different from 
the traditional approach in relation to those senior political and military leaders who 
plan and set into motion a genocidal campaign, who must act with the genocidal 
intent described in article 2 of the Convention. Given that in the Bashir case, the issue 
was not the involvement of a mid-level commander or direct perpetrator but rather an 
individual at the highest leadership level, the Pre-Trial Chamber said the knowledge-
based approach was irrelevant to its determination. 
This may have been underselling the principles of the ‘knowledge-based 
approach’, bearing in mind that it has been developed by scholars who do not entirely 
agree amongst themselves. One feature of the approach is its emphasis not on the 
specific intent of individual perpetrators but rather on the plan or policy behind the 
genocidal campaign itself. It is consistent with the controversial Element in the 
Elements of Crimes because it tends to dismiss the thesis of the lone perpetrator, 
requiring that the destruction of the group be a feasible outcome of the ensemble of 
acts of genocide. For all practical purposes, the knowledge-based approach excludes 
the possibility that genocide is the work of isolated individuals. Genocide results from 
a plan or policy that is the creation of a State or State-like entity. A focus on the mens 
rea of individuals should only then arise with respect to the knowledge of such 
individuals of the plan or policy. If they know of the plan or policy and contribute to 
its implementation, then they have the requisite mens rea. In other words, the starting 
point for the analysis should be the existence of a plan or policy of a body with the                                                         
58 Prosecutor v. Bashir (ICC-02/05-01/09), Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for a Warrant of 
Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, 4 March 2009, para. 139, fn. 154, referring to: Claus 
Kreβ, ‘The Darfur Report and Genocidal Intent’, (2005) 3 Journal of International Criminal Justice 
562, at pp. 565-572; William Schabas, Genocide in International Law, The Crime of Crimes, 2nd ed., 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009, pp. 241-264. 
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capacity to destroy a protected group in whole or in part. To the extent that individual 
criminal responsibility is at issue, the analysis then proceeds to consider the 
knowledge of the plan by the individual and whether or not he or she could avail of an 
excuse or justification that might counteract the apparent mental element. 
The focus on individual intent that features in international criminal law 
cannot be automatically transposed to the debate about State responsibility for 
international crime. In practice, as the International Court of Justice recognised in the 
2007 judgment in the Bosnia case, the word ‘intent’ and even ‘specific intent’ is used 
in the context of an analysis of policy. Whether or not one of the individual 
perpetrators in the Srebrenica massacre manifested the specific intent to commit 
genocide is really quite secondary to whether the events were the product of a 
coordinated plan perpetrated by an entity rather than the perverse product of a single 
mind. 
 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
 
Only a relatively small number of cases at the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the former Yugoslavia have dealt with charges of genocide. It is therefore not 
unusual that it was only in mid-2010 that the Tribunal considered the judgment of the 
International Court of Justice. The Popović et al. case concerned seven accused, four 
of whom were charged with genocide or, in the alternative, aiding and abetting 
genocide as participants in the Srebrenica massacre. Two of the accused, Vujadin 
Popović and Ljubiša Beara, were convicted of genocide, while a third, Drago Nikolić, 
was convicted of aiding and abetting genocide. Ludomir Borovčanin was acquitted of 
the genocide charge but convicted of aiding and abetting the crime against humanity 
of extermination. The Prosecutor did not appeal the acquittal of Borovčanin for 
genocide. 
The Popović Trial Chamber considered the legal elements of the crime of 
genocide in some detail, reviewing the case law on the subject. It cited the Bosnia 
decision of the International Court of Justice on several occasions.59 In almost all of 
these references, the Trial Chamber also referred to rulings of the ad hoc institutions,                                                         
59 Prosecutor v. Popović et al. (IT-05-88-T), Judgment, 10 June 2010, para. 807, fns. 2910 and 2911, 
para. 808, fn. 2913, para. 809, fn. 2916, para. 812, fn. 2925, para. 813, fn. 2926, para. 814, fn. 2929, 
para. 817, fn. 2934, para. 819, fn. 2937, para. 821, fn. 2940, para. 822, fns. 2943 and 2944, para. 827, 
fn. 2958, para. 831, fn. 2968.   
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confirming the consistency of the international case law and the agreement of the 
International Court of Justice with the legal findings of the ad hoc tribunals. Of 
particular interest was its consideration of the punishable acts, especially that of 
causing serious bodily or mental harm. The Trial Chamber approved of the statement 
by the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in 
Seromba that ‘[t]o support a conviction for genocide, the bodily harm or the mental 
harm inflicted on members of a group must be of such a serious nature as to threaten 
its destruction in whole or in part’. 60 It provided as examples of the act ‘torture, 
inhumane or degrading treatment, sexual violence including rape, interrogations 
combined with beatings, threats of death, and harm that damages health or causes 
disfigurement or serious injury to members of the targeted national, ethnical, racial or 
religious group’, 61  citing in support paragraph 319 of the judgment of the 
International Court of Justice in the Bosnia case. The Trial Chamber also noted the 
holding of the Appeals Chamber that forcible transfer ‘does not constitute in and of 
itself a genocidal act’.62 The footnote to this statement said: ‘The International Court 
of Justice has held that neither the intent to render an area ethnically homogenous nor 
operations to implement the policy “can as such be designated as genocide: the intent 
that characterizes genocide is to ‘destroy, in whole or in part,’ a particular group, and 
deportation or displacement of the members of a group, even if effected by force, is 
not necessarily equivalent to destruction of that group”.’63 
Referring to the punishable acts of genocide that are listed in the five 
paragraphs of article 2 of the Genocide Convention, the Trial Chamber said that the 
methods of destruction covered in the third act – ‘Deliberately inflicting on the group 
conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part’ 
– are ‘those seeking a group’s physical or biological destruction’.64 Here it referred in 
support to paragraph 344 of the International Court’s 2007 judgment, citing the 
statement that ‘the destruction of historical, cultural and religious heritage cannot be 
considered to constitute the deliberate infliction of conditions of life calculated to 
bring about the physical destruction of the group’. The Trial Chamber also considered                                                         
60 Ibid., para. 811. 
61 Ibid., para. 812. 
62 Ibid., para. 813. 
63 Ibid., para. 813, fn. 2926, citing Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment  
of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, I.C.J. 
Reports 2007, p. 43, para. 190 (emphasis in the original). 
64 Ibid., para. 814. 
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briefly the fourth act of genocide – ‘Imposing measures intended to prevent births 
within the group’ – in concluding that ‘[t]o amount to a genocidal act, the evidence 
must establish that the acts were carried out with intent to prevent births within the 
group and ultimately to destroy the group as such, in whole or in part’.65 It provided 
as authority two paragraphs from the International Court’s 2007 judgment.66 
The Trial Chamber also devoted significant attention to the contention by one 
of the defendants that the crime of genocide comprised an element of State policy. 
The Trial Chamber rejected this argument, stating that jurisprudence of the ad hoc 
tribunals had ‘made it clear that a plan or policy is not a statutory element of the crime 
of genocide’. 67  The Trial Chamber referred to the Elements of Crimes of the 
International Criminal Court, holding that article 6 of the Rome Statute, which 
consists of the definition of genocide drawn from the 1948 Convention, ‘does not 
prescribe the requirement of “manifest pattern” introduced in the ICC Elements of 
Crimes’.68 The Trial Chamber said that ‘the language of the ICC Elements of Crimes, 
in requiring that acts of genocide must be committed in the context of a manifest 
pattern of similar conduct, implicitly excludes random or isolated acts of genocide’.69 
It said that the Appeals Chamber of the Yugoslavia Tribunal in the Krstić case had 
already said ‘reliance on the definition of genocide given in the ICC’s Elements of 
Crimes is inapposite’.70 Although the passage was not cited by the Trial Chamber in 
Popović, the Appeals Chamber in Krstić had gone on to say that because ‘the 
definition adopted by the Elements of Crimes did not reflect customary law as it 
existed at the time Krstić committed his crimes, it cannot be used to support the Trial 
Chamber’s conclusion’. 71  The Popović Trial Chamber concluded ‘that a plan or 
policy is not a legal ingredient of the crime of genocide… However, the Trial 
Chamber considers the existence of a plan or policy can be an important factor in 
inferring genocidal intent.’ 72  The Popović Trial Chamber did not mention or 
otherwise consider the ruling of the Pre-Trial Chamber of the International Criminal                                                         
65 Ibid., para. 819. 
66 Ibid., para. 819, fn. 2937, citing Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment  
of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, I.C.J. 
Reports 2007, p. 43, para. 355. 




71 Prosecutor v. Krstić (IT-98-33-A), Judgment, 19 April 2004, para. 224. 
72 Prosecutor v. Popović et al. (IT IT-05-88-T), Judgment, 10 June 2010, para. 830. 
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Court issued fifteen months earlier on the Bashir arrest warrant. Here then there is a 
very significant contrast in the interpretation of article 2 of the Convention by 
chambers of the International Criminal Court and the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the former Yugoslavia. 
The Appeals Chamber delivered its judgment in Popović et al. only three days 
before the judgment of the International Court of Justice in Croatia v. Serbia. There 
were only two rather perfunctory references to the 2007 judgment of the Court in the 
Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia case. One of the defendants had invoked the 
decision in support of the contention that there is an implicit requirement in the 
definition of genocide that it be perpetrated pursuant to a plan or policy. The Appeals 
Chamber did not find that the International Court of Justice provided support for this 
argument.73 
The trial of Radovan Karadžić, who was the senior civilian official of the 
Bosnian Serbs for the period from 1992 to 1995, began in October 2009. The 
Prosecutor has alleged that Karadžić, as the highest civilian and military authority in 
the Republika Srpska, participated in an ‘overarching joint criminal enterprise to 
permanently remove Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats from Bosnian Serb-
claimed territory in BiH’. 74  This objective ‘was primarily achieved through a 
campaign of persecutions as alleged in this indictment. In some municipalities, 
between 31 March 1992 and 31 December 1992 this campaign of persecutions 
included or escalated to include conduct that manifested an intent to destroy in part 
the national, ethnical and/or religious groups of Bosnian Muslims and/or Bosnian 
Croats as such. In such municipalities, a significant section of the Bosnian Muslim 
and/or Bosnian Croat groups, namely their leaderships, as well as a substantial 
number of members of these groups were targeted for destruction.’75 The genocidal 
acts that are alleged correspond to the first three paragraphs of article 2 of the 
Genocide Convention, namely, killing, causing serious bodily or mental harm, and 
deliberately inflicting upon detainees conditions of life calculated to bring about their 
physical destruction. 
On 28 June 2012, after the Prosecutor had concluded the presentation of the 
case against the accused, the Trial Chamber granted in part the motion to acquit                                                         
73 Prosecutor v. Popović et al. (IT-05-88-A ), Judgment, 30 January 2015, paras. 438-439. 
74 Prosecutor v. Karadžić (IT-95-5/18), Prosecution’s Marked-Up Indictment, 19 October 2009, para. 
8. 
75 Ibid., para. 38. 
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presented pursuant to Rule 98bis of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence and 
removed the charge of genocide with respect to activities of Bosnian Serb forces in 
the municipalities. It retained the charge of genocide concerning Srebrenica.76 The 
Trial Chamber issued its ruling orally, as has been the practice at the Yugoslavia 
Tribunal for more than a decade. 
With respect to the charge of genocide perpetrated in the municipalities over 
the course of the war as a whole, the Trial Chamber began by stating that it was not 
bound either by earlier findings during trials before the Tribunal or by the judgment of 
the International Court of Justice of February 2007. 77 The Chamber said that the 
evidence submitted to the Tribunal by the Prosecutor indicated ‘that a large number of 
Bosnian Muslims and/or Bosnian Croats were killed by Bosnian Serb forces in the 
municipalities during and after their alleged take-over and while in detention’.78 It 
said this evidence was ‘capable of supporting a conclusion that Bosnian Muslims 
and/or Bosnian Croats were killed on a large scale with the intent to kill with 
persecutory intent’. 79 Furthermore, 
 
the determination of whether there is evidence capable of supporting a conviction for genocide does not 
involve a numerical assessment of the number of people killed and does not have a numeric threshold.  
However, the evidence the Chamber received in relation to the municipalities, even if taken at its 
highest, does not reach the level from which a reasonable trier of fact could infer that a significant 
section of the Bosnian Muslim and/or Bosnian Croat groups and a substantial number of members of 
these groups were targeted for destruction so as to have an impact on the existence of the Bosnian 
Muslims and/or Bosnian Croats as such.80 
 
Turning to the punishable acts of genocide that are enumerated in the five paragraphs 
of article 2 of the Genocide Convention, the Trial Chamber said that ‘serious bodily 
harm must go beyond temporary unhappiness, embarrassment or humiliation, and 
result in a grave and long-term disadvantage to a person's ability to lead a normal and 
constructive life, but it need not be permanent and irremediable’.81 But it added that 
‘in order to support a conviction for genocide, the bodily or mental harm inflicted on 
members of a group must be of such a serious nature as to threaten its destruction in 
                                                        
76 Prosecutor v. Karadžić (IT-95-5/18), Transcript, 28 June 2012, p. 28751, lines 23-25, p. 28752, line 
1, p. 28757, line 25, p. 28758, lines 1-10. 
77 Ibid., p. 28763, lines 20-24. 
78 Ibid., p. 28764, lines 22-25. 
79 Ibid., p. 28765, lines 1-4. 
80 Ibid., p. 28765, lines 4-13. 
81 Ibid., p. 28765, lines 19-22. 
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whole or in part’.82 Referring to the jurisprudence of the Tribunal, and specifically the 
Appeals Chamber ruling in Prosecutor v. Krstić and the Trial Chamber judgment in 
Prosecutor v. Popović et al., the Trial Chamber said this established ‘that forcible 
transfer does not constitute in and of itself a genocidal act, but where attended by such 
circumstances as to lead to the death of the whole or part of the displaced population, 
it may be considered an underlying offence that causes serious bodily or mental 
harm’.83 It said the Chamber had not ‘heard evidence which rises to the level which 
could sustain a conclusion that the serious bodily or mental harm suffered by those 
forcibly transferred in the municipalities was attended by such circumstances as to 
lead to the death of the whole or part of the displaced population for the purposes of 
the actus reus for genocide’.84 
With respect to the third punishable act listed in article 2 of the Convention, 
the Trial Chamber said that in assessing ‘whether conditions of life imposed on the 
targeted group were calculated to bring about its physical destruction, the Chamber 
has to focus on the objective probability of these conditions leading to the physical 
destruction of the group in part and must assess factors like the nature of the 
conditions imposed, the length of time that members of the group were subjected to 
that, and characteristics of the targeted group such as vulnerability’. 85 It said that 
proof that the result was actually achieved was not required in order to sustain a 
conviction. 86 
Speaking of the issue of genocidal intent, the Trial Chamber said: 
 
[I]n the absence of direct evidence that the physical perpetrators of the crimes alleged to have been 
committed in the municipalities carried out these crimes with genocidal intent, the Chamber can infer 
specific intent from a number of factors and circumstances, including the general context of the case, 
the means available to the perpetrator, the surrounding circumstances, the perpetration of other 
culpable acts systematically directed against the same group, the numerical scale of atrocities 
committed, the repetition of destructive and discriminatory acts, the derogatory language targeting the 
protected group, or the existence of a plan or policy to commit the underlying offence.87  
 
The Trial Chamber concluded that ‘there is no evidence that these actions reached a 
level from which a reasonable trier of fact could draw an inference that they were 
committed with an intent to destroy in whole or in part the Bosnian Muslims and/or                                                         
82 Ibid., p. 28766, lines 3-6. 
83 Ibid., p. 28766, lines 12-18. 
84 Ibid., p. 28766, lines 23-25, p. 28767, lines 1-3. 
85 Ibid., p. 28767, lines 11-17. 
86 Ibid., p. 28767, line 22. 
87 Ibid., p. 28768, lines 5-15. 
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Bosnian Croats as such’. 88  It noted in this respect evidence produced by the 
Prosecution of statements and speeches by the accused and others that allegedly 
contained ‘rhetorical warning of the disappearance, elimination, annihilation or 
extinction of Bosnian Muslims in the event that war broke out’. 89 It did not consider 
that such evidence could change its assessment in any respect. 
The Prosecutor appealed the acquittal on the charge of genocide and, on 11 
July 2013, the Appeals Chamber ordered that it be reinstated.90 In other words, the 
defence had a case to answer on the point. The Appeals Chamber considered the Trial 
Chamber decision by first examining the findings with respect to evidence of the three 
punishable acts of genocide that were at issue. Like the Trial Chamber, it insisted it 
was not bound by the factual findings and evidentiary assessments in earlier decisions 
of the Tribunal or by the ruling of the ICJ.91 The Appeals Chamber noted that the 
Trial Chamber had concluded there was evidence that the actus reus of the genocidal 
act of killing had been perpetrated.92 Turning to the punishable act of causing serious 
bodily and mental harm, it referred to evidence of beatings and other forms of 
physical abuse as well as rapes. 93  The Appeals Chamber said that ‘[w]hile the 
commission of individual paradigmatic acts does not automatically demonstrate that 
the actus reus of genocide has taken place, the Appeals Chamber considers that no 
reasonable trial chamber reviewing the specific evidence on the record in this case, 
including evidence of sexual violence and of beatings causing serious physical 
injuries, could have concluded that it was insufficient to establish the actus reus of 
genocide in the context of Rule 98 bis of the Rules’.94 The Appeals Chamber reached 
a similar conclusion with respect to the third act of genocide, citing evidence of 
deprivation of food and other harsh conditions of detention.95                                                         
88 Ibid., p. 28769, lines 3-6. 
89 Ibid., p. 28769, lines 10-12. 
90 Prosecutor v. Karadžić (IT-95-5/18-AR98bis.l), Judgment, 11 July 2013. 
91 Ibid., para. 94. 
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of genocide. Before turning to causing serious bodily and mental harm (beginning at p. 28765, line 14), 
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Having concluded that there was evidence of the three physical acts of 
genocide charged in the indictment, the Appeals Chamber then turned to the issue of 
evidence of genocidal intent. Citing an earlier ruling of the Appeals Chamber, in 
which it had upheld the dismissal of a genocide charge with respect to the 
municipalities96 the Appeals Chamber noted the Prosecutor’s criticism of the Trial 
Chamber ruling for having ‘compartmentalised’ the analysis, but dismissed this 
ground after considering the reasoning of the Trial Chamber.97 The Appeals Chamber 
said that ‘in the context of assessing evidence of genocidal intent, a 
compartmentalised mode of analysis may obscure the proper inquiry’.98 It said that 
instead of ‘considering separately whether an accused intended to destroy a protected 
group through each of the relevant genocidal acts, a trial chamber should consider 
whether all of the evidence, taken together, demonstrates a genocidal mental state’.99 
Under the heading ‘The substantiality of the Groups’, the Appeals Chamber 
considered the pronouncement by the Trial Chamber that the evidence, taken at its 
highest, ‘[did] not reach the level from which a reasonable trier of fact could infer that 
a significant section of the Bosnian Muslim and/or Bosnian Croat groups and a 
substantial number of members of these groups were targeted for destruction so as to 
have an impact on the existence of the Bosnian Muslims and/or Bosnian Croats as 
such’.100 The Appeals Chamber dismissed the objection to this statement made by the 
Prosecutor.101 It also considered issues relating to the relationship of the accused to 
the alleged joint criminal enterprise. There is no need here to develop its reasoning 
because this concerns the matter of individual liability strictly, and does not bear on 
State responsibility at all. In any case, the Tribunal did not find that there was 
reviewable error by the Trial Chamber in this respect.102 
The Appeals Chamber also considered the discussion of public statements 
attributed to the accused and others as evidence of genocidal intent. It found the 
consideration of this matter by the Trial Chamber to be satisfactory.103 Nevertheless, 
it found ‘convincing’ the Prosecutor’s argument that genocidal intent might be shown                                                         
96 Prosecutor v. Stakić (IT-97-24-A), Judgment, 22 March 2006, para. 55. 
97 Prosecutor v. Karadžić (IT-95-5/18-AR98bis.l), Judgment, 11 July 2013, paras. 59-60. 
98 Ibid., para. 56. 
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100 Ibid., para. 61, citing Prosecutor v. Karadžić (IT-95-5/18), Transcript, 28 June 2012, p. 28765, lines 
9-13 (emphasis added by the Appeals Chamber). 
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Genocide and the International Court of Justice - Schabas 24 
by evidence of meetings with the accused.104 The Appeals Chamber said that specific 
intent could be inferred from ‘a number of facts and circumstances, such as the 
general context, the perpetration of other culpable acts systematically directed against 
the same group, the scale of atrocities committed, the systematic targeting of victims 
on account of their membership of a particular group, or the repetition of destructive 
and discriminatory acts’.105 
The Appeals Chamber concluded that ‘the evidence on the record, taken at its 
highest, could indicate that Karadžić possessed genocidal intent. Other evidence on 
the record indicates that other alleged members of the [joint criminal enterprise] also 
possessed such intent’.106 The Appeals Chamber granted the appeal of the Prosecutor 
on the genocide charge relating to the municipalities. 
The significance of this decision could easily be exaggerated and it was 
certainly misunderstood by many observers of the proceedings. The test that is to be 
applied for such motions formulated during the trial and before the defence has 
presented its case and evidence is ‘whether there is evidence (if accepted) upon which 
a reasonable [trier] of fact could be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of 
the accused on the particular charge in question and not whether an accused's guilt has 
been established beyond reasonable doubt’.107 
In December 2012, a Trial Chamber of the Yugoslavia Tribunal convicted 
Zdravko Tolimir of genocide with respect to crimes perpetrated in Srebrenica in mid-
July 1995. It referred to the February 2007 judgment of the International Court of 
Justice as authority for the proposition that ‘[a] perpetrator’s specific intent to destroy 
can be distinguished from the intent required for persecutions as a crime against 
humanity on the basis that a perpetrator who possesses genocidal intent has formed 
more than an intent to harm a group by virtue of his discriminatory acts; he actually 
intends to destroy the group itself’.108 To an extent the Trial Chamber departed from                                                         
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108 Prosecutor v. Tolimir (IT-05-88/2-T), Judgment, 12 December 2012, para. 746 (emphasis in the 
original), citing Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment 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Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007, p. 43, 
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earlier precedent by taking the view that ‘forcible transfer’ could be ‘an additional 
means by which to ensure the physical destruction of a group’.109 It endorsed the 
words of an earlier Trial Chamber decision in Blagojević and Jokić where it was held 
‘that the physical or biological destruction of the group is the likely outcome of a 
forcible transfer of the population when this transfer is conducted in such a way that 
the group can no longer reconstitute itself – particularly when it involves the 
separation of its members’.110 The Tolimir Trial Chamber said it was ‘particularly 
guided’ by this finding of the Trial Chamber in Blagojević and Jokić.111 What it does 
not say is that this aspect of the Blagojević and Jokić Trial Judgment was reversed on 
appeal. The Tolimir Trial Chamber only states that it is ‘cognizant’ of the holding by 
the Appeals Chamber that displacement of a people is not equivalent to destruction 
and that forcible transfer in and of itself is not a genocidal act.112 One of the five 
members of the Appeals Chamber in the Blagojević and Jokić ruling was in dissent. 
Judge Shahabbuddeen would have upheld a conviction of complicity in genocide, 
following a broader approach to the definition of the crime than his four colleagues.113 
As is often the case with a dissenting opinion, it sharpens the debate and clarifies any 
possible ambiguity about the intent of the majority judgment. Just as there can be no 
question that the Appeals Chamber in Blagojević and Jokić did not confirm the broad 
and liberal approach to genocide that had been adopted by the Trial Chamber, there 
can also be little doubt that the Trial Chamber in Tolimir was promoting a similar 
broad and liberal approach to genocide, thereby inviting the Appeals Chamber of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia to reconsider its position. It 
is also striking that the Trial Chamber in Tolimir did not refer to the pronouncement 
of the International Court of Justice on this subject, which was of course completely 
inconsistent with its holding. 
The majority of the Trial Chamber in Tolimir held that the only ‘reasonable 
inference to draw from the evidence’ was that ‘the conditions resulting from the acts                                                         
109 Ibid., para. 765. 
110 Ibid., para. 764, citing Prosecutor v. Blagojević and Jokić (IT-02-60-T), Judgment, 17 January 
2005. 
111 Ibid., para. 764. 
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of Bosnian Serb Forces, as part of the combined effect of the forcible transfer and 
killing operations were deliberately inflicted, and calculated to lead to the physical 
destruction of the Bosnian Muslim population of Eastern BiH’.114  With respect to the 
mens rea, the Trial Chamber said that it ‘ha[d] no doubt that the Bosnian Serb Forces 
who committed the underlying acts set out in Article 4(2)(a)-(c) [of the Statute of the 
ICTY] intended the physical destruction of the Bosnian Muslim population of Eastern 
BiH’.115 
The Tolimir case concerned not only Srebrenica but also the attacks in Žepa, 
which followed in late July 1995. It seems that mass killings, like those in Srebrenica, 
did not occur in Žepa. Nevertheless, three community leaders were murdered by 
Bosnian Serb forces. Holding that there was genocidal intent associated with the 
attacks on Žepa, the majority of the Trial Chamber said that ‘to ensure that the 
Bosnian Muslim population of this enclave would not be able to reconstitute itself, it 
was sufficient - in the case of Žepa - to remove its civilian population, destroy their 
homes and their mosque, and murder its most prominent leaders’.116 In this respect, it 
endorsed an interpretative approach whereby the words ‘in whole or in part’ in article 
2 of the Convention refer not only to a ‘substantial part’ but also a ‘significant part’. It 
concluded: ‘The Majority has no doubt that the murder of Hajrić, Palić and Imamović 
was a case of deliberate destruction of a limited number of persons selected for the 
impact that their disappearance would have on the survival of the group as such. On 
the basis of the above, the Majority, Judge Nyambe dissenting, is satisfied beyond 
reasonable doubt that Bosnian Serb Forces killed the three leaders named in the 
Indictment with the specific genocidal intent of destroying part of the Bosnian 
Muslim population as such.’117 The legal finding by the Trial Chamber on this point is 
both innovative and questionable. The inference that the murder of three community 
leaders constitutes both the mens rea and the actus reus of genocide because of the 
alleged impact this may have on the survival of the group is a rather large 
interpretative step that broadens enormously the scope of the crime. 
In Tolimir, there were also allegations concerning prevention of births within 
the group. The Prosecutor had argued that this act of genocide resulted from ‘the lack 
of similarly-aged men, the loss of a husband's pension upon remarriage, the social                                                         
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stigma of remarriage and feelings of guilt’. The Trial Chamber did not consider that 
‘this consequence of the forcible transfer operation qualifies as a “measure” imposed 
by the Bosnian Serb Forces “intended to prevent births within the group”’.118 There is 
also discussion of the act of ‘conspiracy to commit genocide’ in Tolimir.119 
The Tolimir conviction was upheld on appeal, in a judgment issued on 8 April 
2015. The Appeals Chamber reversed several but not all of the genocide counts but 
did not alter the sentence of life imprisonment. It did not endorse the innovative 
developments of the majority of the Trial Chamber. A detailed discussion of that 
judgment is beyond the scope of this essay. There were several references to the 
February 2015 judgment in Croatia v. Serbia. The Chamber described the 
International Court of Justice as ‘the principal organ of the United Nations and the 





In the 2007 judgment in the Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia case, the International 
Court of Justice built upon the case law of the ad hoc tribunals, especially the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. One of the very 
commendable features of the 2007 ruling was its effort at reconciling the 
interpretation of international legal provisions by international tribunals, thereby 
addressing the problem of fragmentation and encouraging the development of a 
holistic system despite the absence of structural unity in the hierarchical sense of 
domestic legal systems. This attitude towards the case law of specialised international 
tribunals was made more explicit a few years later in the Diallo case. There, the 
International Court of Justice held that while it was ‘in no way obliged, in the exercise 
of its judicial functions, to model its own interpretation’ of the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights on that of the United Nations Human Rights Committee, 
it said it ‘should ascribe great weight to the interpretation adopted by this independent 
body that was established specifically to supervise the application of that treaty’. The                                                         
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Court said this would help ‘to achieve the necessary clarity and the essential 
consistency of international law, as well as legal security, to which both the 
individuals with guaranteed rights and the States obliged to comply with treaty 
obligations are entitled’.121 
There is a slight difference in this respect between the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights and the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 
the Crime of Genocide. The former establishes a ‘treaty body’ in provisions that 
indicate the scope of its singular role. The latter contemplates not one but two 
tribunals with authority for its interpretation without indicating a preference as to ghe 
one that is more authoritative: an ‘international penal tribunal’, in article 6, and the 
International Court of Justice, in article 9. 
In the Bosnia case, the International Court of Justice held that the Yugoslavia 
Tribunal was an ‘international penal tribunal’ contemplated by article 6 of the 
Genocide Convention. Although it did not speak directly to the point in that judgment, 
it is obvious that the International Criminal Court is also a tribunal within the meaning 
of article 6 of the Genocide Convention. In other words, the situation is slightly more 
complicated than it was in the Diallo case because of the multiplicity of international 
tribunals with responsibility for the interpretation of the Convention or of provisions 
derived from it. Moreover, although the drafters of the Convention clearly envisaged 
the distinct role of two different international tribunals, they do not seem to have 
imagined that that there would actually be more than one ‘international penal tribunal’ 
capable of meeting the description in article 6. There seem to be four international 
tribunals that are covered by that definition: the two ad hoc tribunals, the Mechanism 
that succeeds them, and the International Criminal Court. What is to be done when 
there are conflicts in the interpretations proposed by the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Court, as is the 
case with the ‘lone génocidaire’ and the ‘manifest pattern’ issue. Nor can the issues 
be neatly parcelled out, letting the international criminal tribunals deal with matters of 
individual criminal liability while reserving State responsibility for the International 
Court of Justice. The issue of the mental element of the crime of genocide may look 
somewhat different depending upon whether it is approached from the angle of 
individual intent, as has been the tendency at the ad hoc tribunals, or State policy, as                                                         
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may be the correct vision when examined from the perspective of State responsibility. 
The ‘knowledge-based’ approach is of some assistance in solving the problem, 
thereby promoting the unification of international law, an objective that the 
International Court of Justice endorsed in the Diallo case. 
The judgment of the International Court of Justice in the Bosnia case met with 
considerable disappointment in some circles where a broad and expansive definition 
of genocide had been advocated. For decades, basically from the time of the adoption 
of the Convention in 1948, frustration with the narrow terms of article 2 had 
frequently been expressed. Yet it is a fact that the Genocide Convention was only 
intended to cover a narrow range of violations. I was a pioneering document, 
imposing new and unprecedented obligations upon States. At the time, it was 
impossible to achieve any broader consensus within the United Nations General 
Assembly on the punishment of international atrocity crimes. Anxiety about an 
extensive reach of international criminal justice had prompted the four powers at the 
London Conference, in 1945, to limit the scope of crimes against humanity to those 
with a nexus to armed conflict. The Genocide Convention represented huge progress 
over the Charter of the International Military Tribunal because it addressed the crim 
‘whether committed in time of peace or in time of war’. But there was a price to pay 
for this progressive development. The General Assembly genocide narrowly, limiting 
it to certain groups and requiring an intent to destroy, and it attempted to exclude such 
corollaries as the exercise of universal jurisdiction. 
In the decades that followed, dismay with such restrictions manifested itself in 
calls for the definition of genocide to be interpreted very broadly or, alternatively, to 
be amended. There was little in the way of similar initiatives concerning crimes 
against humanity because their repression was not yet governed by a prospective 
treaty of general application. When international criminal justice revived, in the 
1990s, the impetus for expanding the scope of international atrocity crimes manifested 
itself in the enlargement of the definition of crimes against humanity and the 
extension of war crimes to situations of non-international armed conflict. The Rome 
Statute of 1998 confirmed this very dramatic legal evolution. Perhaps revolution is a 
more accurate term. The impunity gap left by the initial codification of the 1940s was 
filled in the 1990s, but by a dramatic enlargement of the scope of crimes against 
humanity and war crimes rather than that of genocide. One consequence was to 
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relieve pressure to expand the definition of genocide, either through amendment or by 
interpretation.  
When the Rome Statute was concluded in 1998, fifty years after the adoption 
of the Genocide Convention, there had been very little judicial interpretation of the 
crime of genocide by international courts and tribunals. The International Court of 
Justice had discussed the substance of the crime but only in the most general terms in 
the 1951 Advisory Opinion. 122 There was also some limited consideration in the 
preliminary rulings in the Bosnia case. The ad hoc tribunals had yet to complete a trial 
where genocide was charged. However, since 1998, there has been a huge body of 
legal interpretation. This essay has only dealt with the most recent highlights, 
confining itself to decisions and judgments since the February 2007 ruling. 
The judgment of the International Court of Justice in the Bosnia case of 
February 2007 had the effect of consolidating a process of stabilisation of the 
definition of genocide that had been underway for several years at the ad hoc 
tribunals. When the ad hoc tribunals began issuing judgments on the interpretation of 
the definition of genocide, there was initially no clarity about the direction this would 
take. For decades, there had been controversy resulting from the narrow scope of the 
definition in article 2 of the 1948 Convention. For proponents of a broad construction 
of the crime, there may have been some hope that this would be achieved through the 
work of the ad hoc tribunals. But this did not prove to be the case. The leading 
decision of the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia, in Krstić in April 2004, left no question about the direction that was 
being taken. A rear-guard effort by one Trial Chamber, in Blagojević and Jokić, to 
reverse the trend towards a relatively narrow and strict interpretation, was quickly 
corrected by the Appeals Chamber. Although debates remain about some issues, the 
broad principles set out in the February 2007 judgment of the International Court of 
Justice made a great contribution to the consolidation of a body of law that is now 
relatively clear and, above all, foreseeable and predictable in its application and 
consequences. There were, to be sure, no surprises in the February 2015 ruling in 
Croatia v. Serbia. It confirmed and further enhanced the process of consolidation and 
stabilization in the judicial interpretation and application of the crime of genocide. 
                                                        
122 Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 
Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1951, p. 23. 
